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USING FEMINIST THEORY TO ADVANCE 
EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW 
Linda L. Berger, Bridget J. Crawford, and Kathryn M. 
Stanchi* 
 Progress toward gender justice faces multiple and growing challenges, not 
only in the United States Supreme Court but at every level of political and cul-
tural debate and decision making. Within this context, feminist theory and 
methods are more necessary than ever.  
 It is therefore timely and fitting that more than 200 hundred lawyers, judg-
es, professors, students, and members of the public gathered for The U.S. Fem-
inist Judgments Project: Writing the Law, Rewriting the Future, a two-day con-
ference hosted by the Center for Constitutional Law at The University of Akron 
School of Law. The conference had several purposes. First and foremost was to 
celebrate the publication of Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of the 
United States Supreme Court.1 Both this volume, the first in a series, and its or-
ganizing focus, the United States Feminist Judgments Project, grew out of the 
work of the Women’s Court of Canada and the U.K. Feminist Judgments Pro-
ject.2 These successful efforts inspired us to embark on a similar project of ap-
plied feminist scholarship—to rewrite from a feminist perspective key United 
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1  FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
(Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger & Bridget J. Crawford, eds., 2016). 
2  For information about the Women’s Court of Canada, see Diane Peters, The Women’s 
Court of Canada, U. AFF., (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.universityaffairs.ca/features/feature-
article/the-womens-court-of-canada/ [https://perma.cc/V7K7-W728]. For information about 
the U.K. Project, see Welcome to the Feminist Judgments Project, FEMINIST JUDGMENTS 
PROJECT https://www.kent.ac.uk/law/fjp/ [https://perma.cc/U579-SW48] (last visited Apr. 
20, 2017). See also Rosemary Hunter et al., FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: FROM THEORY TO 
PRACTICE (2010). 
17 NEV. L.J. 539, BERGER, CRAWFORD, STANCHI - FINAL.DOCX 5/10/17  1:24 PM 
540 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:539  
States Supreme Court decisions on issues of gender justice. As we had hoped, 
the resulting opinions and commentaries demonstrated that judges applying 
feminist perspectives could bring about change in the development of the law, 
even within the constraints of existing doctrine and precedent.  
 The United States Feminist Judgments Project started as many feminist 
movements do—with a small group of committed feminists, including the three 
editors of the project, getting together to discuss the feasibility of rewriting 
United States law. Our first task was to choose a body of law; the possibilities 
in United States law were numerous and daunting. We ended up deciding to fo-
cus on United States Supreme Court opinions as the best forum for the first 
volume because of the influence and significance of the decisions coming out 
of that Court. 
 After the first few preliminary discussions, our small group of feminists 
reached out for help from many others and, in true feminist tradition, we re-
ceived it. The final book represents a feminist collaboration of close to one 
hundred people. First, in choosing the cases to be rewritten, we as editors relied 
on a distinguished group of American constitutional and feminist scholars who 
helped us select from among the many Supreme Court cases ripe for feminist 
re-imagining.3 We then turned to the task of securing authors for our chosen 
cases. We received more than 100 applications in response to our solicitation. 
 As editors of a volume of “feminist judgments,” we thought it crucial to es-
tablish an inclusive process that would assure diversity among the book’s au-
thors. We wanted this to be a feminist project not just in name and substance, 
but also in process and method. And we wanted the “feminist” perspectives in 
Feminist Judgments to be feminisms that are committed not only to gender jus-
tice, but also to principles of equality and full participation for all Americans 
who seek to overcome entrenched discriminations based on race, ethnicity, 
class, and sexual orientation. We were committed as well to overcoming the 
arbitrary hierarchies embedded in the legal academy by including not just ten-
ured full professors, but also more junior faculty, clinical faculty, legal writing 
faculty, and practicing lawyers. We wanted the project to showcase a wide ar-
ray of voices. When we finished our lengthy selection process, we had an im-
pressive and diverse group of more than fifty authors for the twenty-five opin-
ions and accompanying commentaries.4 
 The collaboration did not stop there. Each author went through at least 
three rounds of edits, followed by a long production process. Many of the 
                                                        
3  A full list of our advisory panel members is available on our website. Advisory Panel, U.S. 
FEMINIST JUDGMENTS PROJECT, https://sites.temple.edu/usfeministjudgments/home-2/advisor 
y-panel/ [https://perma.cc/DR3G-LCBU] (last visited Apr. 27, 2017). 
4  To see our full list of authors, visit our website. Authors and Cases: U.S. Feminist Judg-
ments Invited Authors, U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS PROJECT, https://sites.temple.edu/usfemi 
nistjudgments/authors-and-cases/authors-and-cases/ [https://perma.cc/CGZ2-ANUN] (last 
visited Apr. 27, 2017). 
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book’s contributors (and we, as editors) relied throughout the process on the 
advice and guidance of colleagues, student researchers, librarians, and adminis-
trative assistants. The conference presented a public opportunity to recognize 
the work of all who came together to create what we think is a unique contribu-
tion to the scholarly discourse about gender and judging. We are so grateful to 
all who contributed to this book and to this conference. 
 A second purpose of the conference at the Center for Constitutional Law 
was to provide a forum for asking (and attempting to answer) a series of dis-
crete questions about judges and the judicial function. Prime among these ques-
tions is whether judicial diversity matters—that is, whether it is important to 
have judges who are representative of many different groups of people as well 
as many different ways of thinking. On a simplistic level, our reaction might be 
that of course diversity on the bench matters. As Sally Kenney, our conference 
keynote speaker, eloquently argues, diversity in positions of power in all 
branches and all levels of government, including representation by women, is a 
reflection of the health of our nation’s democracy. In Kenney’s view, diversity 
on the bench is a requirement of a representative democracy—it is a civic right 
and responsibility.5 
 The conference also sought to raise the “woman question”—the baseline 
feminist question of the 1980s and 1990s. The “woman question” asks whether 
women are represented in decision-making positions and how the law affects 
women.6 As Catharine MacKinnon has explained, “Feminists have this nasty 
habit of counting bodies and refusing not to notice their gender.”7 This question 
continues to be critical today. As one “counts bodies,” it is important to take 
into account the multiple identities and intersectionalities contained in the cate-
gory “woman.” In the judicial context, for example, judges who understand or 
experience the intersecting relationships among race, ethnicity, class, sexual 
orientation, physical abilities, and many other factors will be more attuned not 
only to their own view of the world but also to the more complex perspectives 
that grow out of these intersectionalities.8  
 Thus, we must simultaneously “count bodies” and recognize diversity 
among women based on their multiple identities. It is of course true that all 
women, like all men or all of any particular group of people, do not necessarily 
share the same experiences or viewpoints. Binary designations of sex and gen-
                                                        
5  See, e.g., SALLY J. KENNEY, GENDER AND JUSTICE: WHY WOMEN IN THE JUDICIARY REALLY 
MATTER (2013). 
6  See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829 (1989). 
7  Catharine A. MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in 
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 35 (1984). 
8  See Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 482 STAN. L. REV. 
821 (1989); Patricia Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKLEY 
WOMEN’S L.J. 191 (1988). 
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der no longer fit.9 More than ever, then, the categories “woman” and    
“man”—not to mention other categories once taken as set in stone—are evolv-
ing and subject to challenge, with gender fluidity increasingly more fitting and 
relevant for many human beings.10 
 All the same, many of us intuitively sympathize with Justice Sotomayor’s 
comment that “a wise Latina woman with the richness of her experiences 
would more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male who 
hasn't lived that life.”11 We accept the common wisdom that judges of different 
backgrounds and experiences will understand the facts and law before them dif-
ferently, at least in part because they are seeing the facts and law through the 
unconscious filters and frames they have acquired from experience. And if that 
is true, it can only be helpful to the judiciary as a whole to add the perspectives 
of judges whose backgrounds and experiences have been little represented in 
the past. At the very least, as Sally Kenney argues, more diversity on the 
bench—and in other political offices—legitimizes our democracy by making 
our political systems truly representative of the populace. 
 If our intuitive understanding is correct, then what is the relationship be-
tween personal identity and judicial perspective? The conference brought that 
question to the forefront. As co-editors of Feminist Judgments, we believe that 
the book stands for the proposition that including feminist perspectives will 
contribute to a richer, more contextual, more nuanced, and fairer jurisprudence. 
We have argued that what makes a “feminist judgment” is its attention to facts 
and context, its willingness to rely on a broad range of authorities, including 
social science data, and its concern for how law can reinforce or challenge ex-
isting hierarchies, stereotypes, or beliefs.12  
 The third purpose of the conference was to showcase the work of an inter-
national group of professors, attorneys, and other researchers who rely on, chal-
lenge, complicate, or extend feminist legal theory. The panels at the conference 
represented a dazzling array of subject matters, methodologies, and inquiries. 
Evident throughout the conference presentations were what Martha Chamallas 
                                                        
9  See, e.g., Sarah Marsh, The Gender-Fluid Generation: Young People On Being Male, Fe-
male or Non-Binary, GUARDIAN (Mar. 26, 2016, 5:52 PM) https://www.theguardian.com/ 
commentisfree/2016/mar/23/gender-fluid-generation-young-people-male-female-trans 
[https://perma.cc/6J7H-4CGP]; Richard A. Friedman, How Changeable Is Gender?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 22, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/23/opinion/sunday/richard-a-fried 
man-how-changeable-is-gender.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/HN7P-N239]. 
10  The change is perhaps exemplified by the fact that the “Word of the Year” in 2015 was 
the use of “they” as a singular pronoun as an acknowledgement of gender fluidity. Katy 
Steinmetz, This Pronoun Is the Word of the Year for 2015, TIME (Jan. 8, 2016), http://tim 
e.com/4173992/word-of-the-year-2015-they/ [https://perma.cc/R63Z-REAH]. See generally 
JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990). 
11  Sonia Sotomayor, Judge Mario G. Olmos Memorial Lecture: A Latina Judge’s Voice, 13 
BERKLEY LA RAZA L.J. 87, 92 (2002). 
12  Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger & Bridget J. Crawford, Introduction to the U. S. 
Feminist Judgments Project, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 1, at 13–22. 
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has called some of the recurring “moves” of feminist legal theory: treating 
women’s experiences as an appropriate subject for legal scholarship, exploring 
complex identities, challenging implicit bias, and unpacking women’s choic-
es.13  
 These “moves” are well represented in the articles included in this Sympo-
sium issue. First, Sally Kenney presents what she calls “a principled and con-
sistent position for feminists about the nature of judging and . . . judicial selec-
tion” in her contribution to the Symposium, Toward a Feminist Political 
Theory of Judging: Neither the Nightmare nor the Noble Dream.14 In Equality 
Writ Large, Phyllis Goldfarb describes the nineteenth century intellectual ori-
gins of a multidimensional and intersectional feminist theory.15 Shoshanna Ehr-
lich’s Ministering (In)Justice: The Supreme Court’s Misreliance on Abortion 
Regret in Gonzalez v. Carhart, focuses on the gender bias implicit in what she 
calls the Supreme Court’s “abortion regret trope.”16 Teri McMurtry-Chubb ex-
plores the gendered aspects of the public constructions of Black parenthood, 
violence against African-Americans, and political movements for Black civil 
rights in her article, “Burn This Bitch Down!”: Mike Brown, Emmett Till, and 
the Gendered Politics of Black Parenthood.17 JoAnne Sweeny’s article, 
Trapped in Public: The Regulation of Street Harassment and Cyber-
Harrassment Under the Captive Audience, asks what role law can play in ad-
dressing public intimidation of women by men.18 Andrea Orwoll challenges the 
linguistic erasure of women in Pregnant “Persons”: The Linguistic Defanging 
Of Women’s Issues And The Legal Danger Of “Brain-Sex” Language.19 
In each of these articles, the authors invite engagement with what it means 
to be an autonomous person with a complex personal identity who is also deep-
ly connected to others. Each author asks about the disconnect between the 
law’s promise of equality and life as it is lived on the ground.  
 The fourth and final goal of the conference—and one that extends to the 
pages of this issue of the Nevada Law Journal—is to create a community. For 
two days in Akron, Ohio, the assembled group came together to think in a sus-
tained way about the highest and best aspirations for what the law could be, es-
                                                        
13  MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 4–7, 13–15 (3d ed. 
2013). 
14 Sally Kenney, Toward a Feminist Political Theory of Judging: Neither the Nightmare nor 
the Noble Dream, 17 NEV. L.J. 549 (2017). 
15  Phyllis Goldfarb, Equality Writ Large, 17 NEV. L.J. 565 (2017). 
16  Shoshanna Ehrlich, Ministering(In)Justice: The Supreme Court’s Misreliance on Abortion 
Regret in Gonzalez v. Carhart, 17 NEV. L.J. 599 (2017). 
17  Teri McMurtry-Chubb, “Burn This Bitch Down!”: Mike Brown, Emmett Till, and the 
Gendered Politics of Black Parenthood, 17 NEV. L.J. 619 (2017). 
18  JoAnne Sweeny, Trapped in Public: The Regulation of Street Harassment and Cyber-
Harrassment Under the Captive Audience Doctrine, 17 NEV. L.J. 651 (2017). 
19 Andrea Orwoll, Pregnant “Persons”: The Linguistic Defanging Of Women’s Issues And 
The Legal Danger Of “Brain-Sex” Language, 17 NEV. L.J. 667 (2017). 
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pecially as the law relates to the unfinished promise of economic, social, and 
political equality between and among women, men, and people of all gender 
identities. In creating an inclusive conference atmosphere, we were acting on 
our own feminist belief that how, when, and where we talk about justice mat-
ters. It is an urgent epistemic and democratic priority that we do so as part of an 
engaged and respectful community. This is not to say that we expected agree-
ment at the conference or beyond about feminism generally (or any topic in 
particular). As academics, we celebrate differences of opinion as worthy of fur-
ther discussion and inquiry. And as co-convenors of the United States Feminist 
Judgments Project, we are especially gratified that the conference provided op-
portunities to begin many conversations. In these pages, it is a privilege to con-
tinue these conversations and engage with each other on the important role that 
feminist theory plays in legal reasoning—in scholarship, on the bench, in the 
classroom, and in our daily lives.  
 As we contemplate the capacity of feminist theory to advance justice, we 
identify several questions for the future that merit extended attention. First, 
what precisely is feminist judging? How can it be defined and recognized? We 
have already emphasized that feminist judgments are possible and that the fem-
inist consciousness that marks such judgments can be acquired rather than be-
ing an innate characteristic.20 Nonetheless, feminist judging—no matter how it 
is defined—appears more likely to occur when the judiciary looks more like 
America in its diversity of persons, backgrounds, and perspectives. In other 
words, judges should represent the full spectrum of sexes and gender identities, 
races and ethnicities, sexual orientations, economic classes, physical abilities, 
and cultural backgrounds.  
 Like the default fonts and automatic correction assumptions built into 
word-processing programs, the default positions in the judicial system are es-
tablished by the system’s designers and managers. It should come as no sur-
prise when the default positions in the justice system fail to take into account 
the full range of human-ness. By asking the feminist question about various ju-
dicial default positions—what does this law or this opinion or this policy mean 
for children, the poor, people on every point of the gender spectrum, people of 
color, persons with disabilities, residents of rural areas, oil workers, farmers, 
and labor union members—we have a shot at unearthing those assumptions and 
default positions that treat some Americans as less deserving of the law’s pro-
tection for their fundamental rights and liberties. In the coming months and 
years, this question will be asked more frequently and more customarily if the 
judges (and lawyers) who argue and decide these issues look more like more of 
us.  
                                                        
20  See Rosemary Hunter, Can *Feminist* Judges Make a Difference, 15 INT’L J. LEGAL 
PROF. 7 (2008). 
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 Beyond a diverse judiciary, we argued in Feminist Judgments that feminist 
judging is, among other things, the result of applying feminist practical reason-
ing. That is, feminist judging recognizes that both the framing of legal issues 
and the construction of solutions depend on “the intricacies of each specific 
factual context.”21 This kind of reasoning brings together individual voices with 
broader contextual information drawn from history, psychology, and the politi-
cal and social sciences. It is reasoning that consciously seeks outsider voices 
and is open to recognizing unconscious bias. But feminist practical reasoning is 
not without pitfalls. During the conference, several presentations cast doubt on 
the value of some of the so-called Brandeis briefs and stories briefs filed in re-
cent cases before the U.S. Supreme Court.22 Researched and drafted by partisan 
supporters of one side or the other, there is no guarantee that these amicus 
briefs drawing on individual stories and social science research findings will 
provide complete or objectively well-supported information. One of the contin-
uing questions then is how to present contextual information to judges so that it 
can be effectively tested and weighed by those who have the inclination to look 
beyond their own experience or perspective. 
 This question of context naturally leads to a discussion about the role of 
lawyers. What is the relationship between feminist judging and lawyering? The 
rewritten opinions in Feminist Judgments demonstrate that the law would have 
developed very differently had feminist perspectives been applied at critical 
moments in time. Even though the opinion writers worked within the law and 
the facts that existed at the time of the original opinions, they asked new ques-
tions, applied new reasoning methods, and turned to new sources of authority. 
The rewritten opinions thus revealed the incremental way in which constitu-
tional interpretation—like the common law—is built one precedent at a time. 
Although it is possible to wish for a cohesive and coherent body of law to 
spring forth all at once on a particular subject matter, the decentralized and or-
ganic approach taken by Feminist Judgments reveals the richness and strength 
of diverse thinking that changes over time.  
 To support feminist judging, practicing lawyers can and should take the 
lead in expanding the possibilities for multiple or alternative judgment perspec-
tives, first by developing various approaches to diversify the bench. In some 
states, for example, elections are thought to be better than the merit appoint-
ment system for bringing about a more diverse judiciary, but that likely de-
pends on local conditions. Next, the lawyers in each individual case are the key 
to widening the opportunities for broader judicial understanding of complex 
situations by providing the materials that may empower judges to go about their 
decision making more reflectively. If gender consciousness is not a component 
of biological identity but instead may be acquired through personal experiences 
                                                        
21  Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 851 (1990).  
22  See, e.g., Ehrlich, supra note 16. 
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and encounters with information that unsettles prior assumptions, the lawyers 
in a particular case are the primary means for presenting those additional views.  
 To fulfill this charge, lawyers must themselves be able to think differently 
and more expansively about both the law and the facts. As the Feminist Judg-
ments project demonstrates, many things in a lawsuit are “givens,” but not all 
facts and law are as fixed or static as they might appear. For example, a number 
of the rewritten opinions use different sources of law to reason to a different 
result. Phyllis Goldfarb used the long-ignored privileges and immunities clause 
to argue that Myra Bradwell was denied a right fundamental to federal citizen-
ship when Illinois rejected her right to practice law.23 Leslie Griffin turned to 
the Establishment Clause to strike down the Hyde Amendment on the basis that 
the Amendment’s restriction on abortions enacted a personal moral principle 
into law and amounted to an establishment of religion.24  
 Other rewritten opinions looked at the facts and saw reality differently than 
the original decision makers. In Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School Dis-
trict, for example, the feminist judgment pointed out that when a teacher has 
sex with a fourteen-year-old student, that is not a “relationship” but instead is 
rape.25 In Loving v. Virginia, the feminist judgment made the historical case 
that laws constituting interracial marriage a crime are inextricably linked to and 
the result of hundreds of years of enacting and enforcing laws aimed at control-
ling black bodies.26 These examples illustrate that distinctive and stereotype-
challenging characterizations of the facts can help determine the outcome of the 
case. 
 Finally, in considering the relationship of feminist theory to justice, what 
avenues besides feminist judging show promise for advancing social justice in 
the law? When lawyers and judges think about pursuing social change, they 
naturally turn to filing suit or seeking new or amended legislation. But there are 
other avenues—both complementary and different. As an example, Nan Hunter 
has suggested that the litigation victory for same-sex marriage in the U.S. Su-
preme Court was advanced by a hybrid political-litigation-public-relations 
strategy that brought about change much more quickly than litigation alone 
might have.27 In 2004, a majority of the proposed ballot measures that opposed 
same-sex marriage were approved. Only twelve years later, the national con-
sensus had shifted, and the Supreme Court’s decision in favor of same-sex mar-
                                                        
23  See Phyllis Goldfarb, Rewritten Opinion in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873), in 
FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 1, at 55. 
24  Leslie Griffin, Rewritten Opinion in Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), in FEMINIST 
JUDGMENTS, supra note 1, at 242. 
25  Ann Bartow, Rewritten Opinion in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 524 
U.S. 274 (1998), in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 1, at 426. 
26  Teri McMurtry-Chubb, Rewritten Opinion in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), in 
FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 1, at 114. 
27  Nan A. Hunter, Professor of Law, Georgetown Law, Faculty Enrichment Presentation at 
UNLV William S. Boyd School of Law (Oct. 14, 2016). 
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riage seemed like just one more falling domino. That decision was the result 
not of litigation alone but of a well-planned and consistent public relations and 
political campaign. This is just one of many possible examples.  
 Applying this question to future Feminist Judgments projects, what ave-
nues show particular promise? In the Feminist Judgment Series, we anticipate 
that the editors of specific topical volumes will take on new subject matters 
both horizontally and vertically and that they will encompass different levels of 
judicial decision making. Because prevailing processes are as hard to overcome 
as prevailing assumptions, we hope that future projects will examine other pos-
sibilities. For example, if there is feminist judging, surely there is a feminist 
civil procedure, feminist clinical work, and feminist mediation and negotiation. 
And if there is feminist judging, surely there are other rhetorical methods, per-
haps even other genres, in which to express the results.  
The articles in this issue of the Nevada Law Journal play an important part 
in developing our understanding of the relationship between feminist theory 
and equal justice. They explore significant questions about the history and cur-
rent legal construction of sex, gender, and many other aspects of individual 
identities. We hope that you will find them as engaging as we do. We look for-
ward to continuing the conversations. 
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